Em estangeiro* é que a gente se entende

"(...) The eurozone as a whole is in better fiscal shape than other developed economies (notably the US and Japan), and even the most indebted economies could yet dig themselves out of the hole they are in. But the eurozone is still plagued by the contradictions of trying to operate a monetary union without supporting this with a fiscal union.It is becoming clear that these contradictions can only be solved if there is genuine burden sharing inside the eurozone, along with some much tougher budgetary and regulatory rules which prevent this situation ever happening again. (...)

if the EU could wave a magic wand and create a fiscal union tomorrow, its overall budgetary position would be easily the best in the developed world. There would be no “European” sovereign debt crisis. It is very important to remember this, because it shows that the solution to this problem lies in Europe’s own hands.The second point to note is that the peripheral eurozone economies (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain), taken as a group, have quite similar budgetary requirements as the advanced nations as a whole - no better, but no worse either (at least on the latest IMF numbers). In fact, the only country which seems to be a potential outlier is Ireland, and these IMF figures do not take account of the extra tightening of 4 per cent of GDP which is promised in the coming budget. If this is passed, the Irish numbers would suddenly look much better. Based on this, it might seem surprising that this block of countries is in such trouble.(...)

If politicians want to preserve the monetary union (and it appears that everyone still does), they will need to come to an agreement under which there is some further fiscal co-operation between member states while the budgetary tightening takes effect in the periphery. And in exchange for this there will have to be much tougher long term budgetary and regulatory arrangements, so that the financial free riding which occurred in the boom years (and which actually affected private debt, rather than public debt) can never again take place.(...)"

Excerto do artigo de Gavyn Davies, no Financial Times (via Pedro Adão e Silva*, via Pedro Lains)